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ABSTRACT 
 
This note examines the current and historical antitrust laws of the United States and the European 
Union as they relate to the currently pending merger between Bayer and Monsanto. It focuses 
alternatively on the legality of the merger under modern antitrust laws and the impact such a deal 
could have on the agribusiness industry in both Europe and the United States. Ultimately, the note 
argues that the Bayer-Monsanto merger is illegal and should be blocked by the proper authorities 
in the United States and the European Union. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“They were a gigantic combination of capital, which had crushed all opposition, and 
overthrown the laws of the land, and was preying upon the people.” Upton Sinclair, The Jungle.1 
The United States and the European Union have well-established antitrust laws that strictly 
scrutinize mergers and acquisitions between large companies that can dominate the market and 
impede fair competition.2 The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Antitrust 
Division in the U.S. and the European Commission in the EU enforce these regulations, and 
violators can be subject to strict penalties.3 
In 2016, Bayer proposed to purchase Monsanto in a merger worth $66 billion.4 As of 2017, 
the merger is still pending and will need to be approved in thirty jurisdictions worldwide, such as 
Canada, Brazil, the United States, and the European Union.5 Bayer, known primarily as a 
pharmaceutical giant in the United States, is a major producer of agricultural chemicals and 
pesticides.6 Monsanto, in addition to producing Roundup (a weed-killer),7 is a major manufacturer 
of genetically-modified seeds in the United States.8 A merger between these companies, which 
operate in the same industry, is arguably illegal in both the United States and the European Union 
under current antitrust laws. Allowing the Bayer-Monsanto merger to proceed would be 
detrimental to both American and European farmers, as prices are likely to increase while available 
selections will decrease,9 and innovation is threatened.10 The Federal Trade Commission, United 
States Department of Justice Antitrust Division, and the European Commission should block the 
merger from progressing. 
This note will analyze the pending merger with the following format: the first part will 
discuss the background details surrounding the Bayer-Monsanto merger of 2016. It will note 
                                                          
1 Upton Sinclair, THE JUNGLE 376 (Upton Sinclair, 1920). 
2 See FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws (last visited Jan. 29, 2017); see also EUR. COMM’N, ANTITRUST: OVERVIEW, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/antitrust/overview_en.html (last visited Oct 22, 2016). 
3 Id. 
4 Bayer-Monsanto Deal Likely to Face Intense Regulatory, Political Scrutiny, SANTA BARBARA POST, Sept. 
15, 2016, http://www.santabarbarapost.com/index.php/sid/247666387. 
5 Id. 
6 Drew Harwell, Bayer and Monsanto to Merge in Mega-Deal That Could Reshape World’s Food Supply, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/09/14/bayer-and-monsanto-
merge-in-mega-deal-aimed-at-domi-worlds-food-supply/?utm_term=.74f19298ed42. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Associated Press, Here’s How a Bayer-Monsanto Merger Affects Workers, Farmers, and Investors, 
FORTUNE.COM (May 24, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/24/bayer-monsanto-merger/. 
10 Christopher Alessi & Jacob Bunge, Bayer, Monsanto Shareholders Not All Cheering Over $57 Billion 
Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/bayer-shareholders-mostly-upbeat-about-monsanto-
deal-1473944548.  
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briefly both the monetary aspects of the deal and the political backlash that has already occurred 
and that is likely to continue should the merger be approved. 
 The second and third parts will focus on the laws that exist pertaining to the merger in 
both the United States and the European Union. It will first focus on the laws existing in the United 
States and include an explanation of the relevant laws: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act. It will 
also review the prominent antitrust case Sherman Oil Co. v. United States.11 The section will 
examine potential problems and antitrust violations caused by the merger. It will conclude with a 
discussion of American agribusiness and the reactions of farmers including a discussion of the 
antitrust laws in the U.S., potential antitrust violations and problems the merger will face, and the 
potential impact of the merger on American agribusiness.  
In the third part, the note will begin with a brief discussion of the countries that comprise 
the European Union. It will then focus on the laws that pertain to the merger in the European 
Union, including a discussion of the antitrust laws in the EU, set out primarily in the Treaty for the 
Functioning of the European Union.12 It will discuss potential antitrust violations and problems 
the merger will face, and the potential impact of the merger on European agribusiness. This section 
will also discuss the heavy anti-GMO sentiment in Europe and how that may have political 
ramifications in regards to the merger. 
Finally, an argument will be made that the Bayer-Monsanto merger is a violation of United 
States and European Union antitrust laws. This section will consider available information 
regarding the possible benefits and detriments consumers (primarily those working in farming) in 
both locations may face as well as the impact the deal will have on other pending agribusiness 
mergers. The note will conclude that the Federal Trade Commission and European Union should 
block the proposed Bayer Monsanto Merger. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. A Review of the Bayer-Monsanto Merger 
 
 Across the globe, farmers are experiencing a profit drought as crop prices decline and seed 
prices increase, a reflection of the industry’s “wrenching downturn.”13 The market saturation of 
crops has forced farmers to drop their prices and reduce spending on materials—including seeds, 
pesticides, and fertilizer—negatively impacting sales on major agribusiness companies 
worldwide.14 As a result, major agribusiness corporations are combing their assets and minimizing 
their costs; “four major agribusiness mergers have been announced in the last year.”15 Most 
                                                          
11 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911). 
12 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 2. 
13 Leslie Picker et al., Bayer Deal for Monsanto Follows Agribusiness Trend, Raising Worries for Farmers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/business/dealbook/monsanto-bayer-
deal.html?_r=2. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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prominent among these deals is the recently proposed merger between Bayer and Monsanto; at 
approximately $66 billion, it could be the “the largest acquisition of 2016.”16 
 As may be expected from a merger of this magnitude, antitrust concerns have been raised 
worldwide.17 There is a particular concern in the United States, where recent agribusiness 
consolidations “would place more than 80% of U.S. corn-seed sales and 70% of the global 
pesticide market under just three companies.”18 In addition to the Bayer Monsanto merger, there 
are pending mergers between Dupont and Dow, as well as between Syngenta and ChemChina.19 
The European Union faces a similar problem with its corn-seed and pesticide markets, and will be 
closely analyzing the deal while considering the overall changing landscape in agribusiness.20  
 In the United States, it may not initially seem to be a major antitrust concern, as Bayer is 
primarily known for its pharmaceutical business.21 However, another branch of the company 
focuses on “agriculture chemicals, crop supplies and compounds that kill bugs and weeds.”22 The 
chemical business is the second largest in the world.23 Monsanto, of course, is a major United 
States manufacturer of seeds (specifically, genetically modified seeds).24 Monsanto additionally 
manufactures the weed-killer Roundup.25 The merger would result in a company that has a major 
interest in both the seeds that are sold to farmers and the pesticides used to protect the crops that 
grow from those seeds.26 The merger could potentially dominate the farming industry.27 
 This merger will likely face political backlash. Already, United States Senators such as 
Mike Lee and Bernie Sanders, have expressed concerns regarding the merger.28 Sanders 
commented, “‘The attempted takeover of Monsanto by Bayer is a threat to all Americans. These 
mergers boost the profits of huge corporations and leave Americans paying even higher prices. 
Not only should this merger be blocked, but the Department of Justice should reopen its 
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 Bayer’s Deal for Monsanto, WALL ST. J. AT A GLANCE (Sept. 14, 2016, 3:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
briefly/2016/09/14/bayers-deal-for-monsanto-at-a-glance/. 
18 Id. 
19 Colin Todhunter, Bayer-Monsanto Deal Hints at Dark Future Of Corporate Monopolies, HUFFINGTON 
POST CAN. (Sept. 16, 2016, 10:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/colin-todhunter/bayer-monsanto-
monopoly_b_12025918. html. 
 20 Picker et al., supra note 13. 
21 Harwell, supra note 6. 
22 Id. 
23 Todhunter, supra note 19. 
24 Picker et al., supra note 13. 
25 Harwell, supra note 6. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.  
28 Picker et al., supra note 13. 
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investigation of Monsanto’s monopoly over the seed and chemical market.”29 Constituents, fearing 
rising input costs to their farms, have reached out to their elected officials.30  
Historically, the completion of the merger is much more likely under a conservative 
administration, yet not all Republicans are backing the deal.31 Republican Senator Mike Lee 
expressed the following sentiment:  
 
The transaction has the potential to result in a significant loss of competition and 
reduced incentives and ability to innovate, thereby raising prices and reducing 
consumer choice. I will encourage the DOJ or FTC to closely scrutinize the transaction 
and will consider whether a hearing is necessary to fully explore the competition issues 
raised by so much consolidation in such a short time.32  
 
Lee has been outspoken about antitrust law in general, reminding the country that “antitrust 
law is and should be a nonpartisan issue. It should be an issue that is neither liberal nor 
conservative.”33 
 Bayer’s offer to buy Monsanto raises additional concerns in the European Union, where 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) face skepticism and strict regulation.34 In Germany 
(Bayer’s home country), the deal is likely to create a “mega public relations challenge,”35 as some 
“view Monsanto as the main example of American corporate evil.”36 An alliance with Monsanto 
could tarnish Bayer’s reputation.37 Bayer appears to be anticipating the damage, as it has retained 
the services of two large public relations firms to provide guidance on the merger.38 
                                                          
29 David Francis, Is the Bayer-Monsanto Merger Too Big to Succeed?, DENVER POST, Sept. 18, 2016, 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/18/bayer-monsanto-merger/. 
 30 Associated Press, supra note 9. 
31 Brian Schwartz, Bayer-Monsanto’s $66B Deal Roils Regulators and Now Politicians, FOX BUS. (Sept. 
15, 2016), http://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/2016/09/15/bayer-monsantos-66b-deal-roils-regulators-and-now-
politicians.html. 
32 Id.  
33 Diane Bartz, Conservative U.S. Senator Won’t Fault Obama on Antitrust Law, REUTERS, Sept. 9, 2015, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-congress-antitrust-idUSL1N11F2T820150909. 
34 Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: European Union, LIBR. OF CONG. (June 9, 2015), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/eu.php.  
35 Stefan Nicola & Birgit Jennen, Bayer’s Mega Monsanto Deal Faces Mega Backlash in Germany, 
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2016 8:42 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-19/bayer-s-mega-deal-
for-monsanto-faces-mega-pr-backlash-in-germany. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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 As Bayer prepares to seek approval in over 30 jurisdictions worldwide,39 it will need to 
consider various antitrust laws. Both the United States and the European Union have well-defined 
antitrust laws regulators will consider when determining the legality of the merger. 
 
B. United States Antitrust Laws 
i. The Applicable Laws 
 
The United States has a relatively long history of antitrust laws that are primarily governed 
by four acts: The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, the 
Clayton Act of 1914, and the Hart-Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976.40 The 
Sherman Antitrust Act is the oldest antitrust law in America, yet it is in many ways still valid law.41 
This Act prohibits “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade,”42 as well as 
any “monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize.”43 
It is important to remember that the Sherman Act does not prevent every act that restricts trade; 
reasonable partnerships and mergers are permissible.44 Unreasonable restrictions of trade found to 
be in violation of this Act “may be prosecuted as criminal or civil offenses.”45 The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) advises that in general, these violations are criminally prosecuted when 
                                                          
39 Bayer-Monsanto Deal, supra note 4. 
40 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
41 Id. 
42 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; see also Restrictions on Genetically Modified 
Organisms, supra note 34.  
 43 Id. More specifically:  
Section 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty: Every contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage 
in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, 
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court. Section 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty: Every 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other 
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or 
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court. Id. 
44 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
45 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (Apr. 
1995), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-enforcement-guidelines-international-operations. 
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“competitors fix prices or rig bids.”46 Still, a merger resulting in an unfair share of the market can 
result in fines of up to $10 million for a corporate defendant.47 
 As with many broad statutes, the Sherman Antitrust Act was limited by relevant case law: 
specifically, Standard Oil Co. v. United States.48 Here, the United States filed suit against the 
Standard Oil Co. and 37 other defendants for conspiring to restrain the trade and commerce in 
petroleum and to monopolize the petroleum industry.49 Although the Supreme Court held that the 
Sherman Oil Company did violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, it established a standard of review 
that would limit the transactions considered illegal under the Act.50 When considering a case where 
the actions of those involved restrict trade, “the rule of reason becomes the guide.”51 Transactions 
are tested on whether the restrictions to trade they created were reasonable. In this case, the actions 
of the corporate defendants were deemed an unreasonable restriction to trade.52 
 Not long after the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was passed, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914 came into effect. The Federal Trade Commission Act created the Federal 
Trade Commission, a governing body in U.S. antitrust law.53 The Act also expressly prohibited 
                                                          
46 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
47 Id. 
48 Standard Oil, 31 S. Ct. at 504. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 516. 
51 Id. at 518.  
52 Id. at 524. 
53 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
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“unfair methods of competition.”54 Per the United States Supreme Court, Sherman Antitrust 
violations are, by default, violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act.55 
Expanding on the laws already in place, the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 provides a 
clearer view of the federal government’s stance on large acquisitions.56 Specifically, the Act states 
that  
                                                          
54 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. The unfair methods of competition are 
detailed more thoroughly in §45:  
Unfair methods of competition unlawful; prevention by Commission 
(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; inapplicability to foreign trade 
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful. 
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, 
except banks, savings and loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this title, Federal credit 
unions described in section 57a(f)(4) of this title, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate 
commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to part A of subtitle VII of title 49, and persons, 
partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as 
amended [7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.], except as provided in section 406(b) of said Act [7 U.S.C. 227(b)], from 
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce. 
(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving commerce with foreign 
nations (other than import commerce) unless— 
(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect— 
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on import commerce with foreign 
nations; or 
(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such commerce in the United 
States; and 
(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsection, other than this paragraph. 
If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the operation of subparagraph 
(A)(ii), this subsection shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States. 
(4)(A) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" includes such acts 
or practices involving foreign commerce that— 
(i) cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United States; or 
(ii) involve material conduct occurring within the United States. 
(B) All remedies available to the Commission with respect to unfair and deceptive acts or practices shall 
be available for acts and practices described in this paragraph, including restitution to domestic or foreign 
victims. Id.  
55 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
56 Id. 
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no person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall 
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share 
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission 
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce 
or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of 
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.57   
 
More plainly, this act forbids one business from buying all or part of another business that would 
significantly incapacitate the industry.58  
In 1976, the Clayton Act was amended.59 The amendment, known as the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act, is particularly important because it details the procedures that must 
be followed at the federal level for one corporation to legally acquire another.60 Specifically, large 
organizations must submit premerger filings with the federal government so that they may be 
scrutinized and approved.61  
The laws above are enforced by two agencies: the Federal Trade Commission and the 
United States Department of Justice.62 The agencies are complementary.63 The Federal Trade 
Commission, established in 1914, “may ‘gather and compile information concerning, and to 
investigate from time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of 
any person, partnership, or corporation engaged in or whose business affects commerce, excepting 
banks, savings and loan institutions.’”64 Its investigative powers are rather broad. The agency may 
also enforce the federal antitrust laws.65 Violations of a Federal Trade Commission order may 
result in injunctions or civil penalties.66 
Specifically in antitrust law, the Federal Trade Commission has adjudication and 
rulemaking administrative enforcement powers, in addition to judicial enforcement powers.67 
                                                          
57 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. 
58 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
59 Id. 
60 Id.; see Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a. 
61 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
62 FTC, THE ENFORCERS, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/enforcers (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
63 Id. 
64 FTC, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority. 
65 FTC, THE ENFORCERS, supra note 62. 
66 Id. 
67 FTC, BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FTC’S INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY, supra note 64. 
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“Where a violation of the Clayton Act is alleged, the Commission proceeds under Section 11 of 
the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 21), which parallels Section 5(b) of the FTC Act in authorizing 
adjudicatory proceedings.”68 The Federal Trade Commission has the authority to create rules under 
Section 18 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.69 Judicially, “[t]he Commission may also obtain 
permanent injunctive relief against an antitrust violation in an appropriate case, as well as 
disgorgement of unjust enrichment, restitution for injury suffered by consumers (e.g., the refund 
of overcharges attributable to price-fixing) or other appropriate equitable remedies.”70 
The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division is guided by this mission statement: “The 
mission of the Antitrust Division is to promote economic competition through enforcing and 
providing guidance on antitrust laws and principles.”71 It is the Division’s goal to enforce laws, 
provide guidance, and advocate for fair competition.72 In cases of suspected federal antitrust 
violations, the Federal Trade Commission will consult with the Antitrust Division before launching 
an investigation.73 This way, only one agency will investigate the alleged offenses.74 
There are several key differences between the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division.75 They include: 
 
● The Department of Justice can pursue criminal sanctions, while the Federal Trade 
Commission is limited to civil sanctions.76 
● The Department of Justice generally focuses on financial services, 
telecommunications, and agriculture, while the Federal Trade Commission generally 
focuses on defense, pharmaceutical, and retail industries.77 This is particularly 
noteworthy considering that while the proposed Bayer Monsanto merger is agricultural 
in nature, Bayer remains a top pharmaceutical company worldwide. 
● The Federal Trade Commission may file an administrative complaint before seeking 
civil sanctions, while the Department of Justice does not have an administrative option 
and must begin by filing a suit in federal court.78 
                                                          
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MISSION (July 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission. 
72 Id. 
73 FTC, THE ENFORCERS, supra note 62. 
74 Id. 
75 Todd N. Hutchinson, Understanding the Differences Between the DOJ and the FTC, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the101201practice_series/understandingdifferences
.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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ii. Problems and Antitrust Violations 
 
There are growing concerns that a merger between Bayer and Monsanto is illegal under 
the federal antitrust laws (particularly the Clayton Act).79 The companies are two of the largest 
suppliers of seed and farm supplies, so opposing forces are concerned that competition in this area 
would be substantially decreased.80 In the cotton industry alone, the two companies represent 70% 
of the market.81 In addition to regulatory scrutiny, independent organizations have expressed an 
opposition to the merger.82 SumOfUs, a self-described “international corporate watchdog,” has 
already begun an international petition to stop the merger.83 
Since the mid-1990s, the seed industry has seen a dramatic decrease of companies and a 
dramatic increase of prices.84 In a recent report issued by SumOfUs, “Maurice Stucke and Allen 
Grunes [formerly of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division] said that the merger would 
violate the Clayton Act, which was enacted to curb anticompetitive business practices, and would 
eliminate direct competition between Bayer and Monsanto, which are two of the largest players in 
the genetically engineered seed industry.”85 The 21-page report outlines the following concerns: 
 
The merger would: 
 
● Increase concentration in already concentrated industries for genetic traits, seed, and 
herbicides. For example, Bayer-Monsanto post-merger would account for 
approximately 70 percent of the U.S. acreage for cotton, with similar or higher shares 
in different regions of the U.S. 
● Increase Monsanto’s already significant market power and increase its dominance in 
herbicides and genetic traits for seed. 
● Eliminate not only the direct competition between Bayer and Monsanto for traits, 
herbicide, and crop seed, but also the head-to-head competition in agricultural 
biotechnology innovation markets and reduce opportunities for pro-competitive 
research and development (R&D) collaborations. 
                                                          
79 Antitrust Experts Warn against Proposed Bayer-Monsanto Merger, SUMOFUS, 
https://www.bayermonsantomerger.com/a/bayer-monsanto-press (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 John Kennedy, Former DOJ Officials Warn against Bayer-Monsanto Merger, LAW360 (Aug. 3, 2016, 
9:40 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/824584/former-doj-officials-warn-against-bayer-monsanto-merger. 
85 Id. 
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● Likely lead to higher input prices, less choice and higher food prices for consumers, 
including fewer non-biotechnology options available to farmers and consumers.86 
 
There are additional concerns that a Bayer-Monsanto merger would directly violate a 
federal order regarding the latter company.87 In 2007, Monsanto attempted to acquire Delta & Pine 
Land Co.88 In response to the Department of Justice’s concerns about antitrust violations, 
“Monsanto agreed to divest some cottonseed and cotton breeding assets to a buyer the DOJ 
believed would maintain competition.”89 Bayer purchased the assets, and “if the merger proceeds, 
Monsanto would reacquire them, violating the final judgment, which specifically forbids the 
company from buying back any of the divestitures prior to 2018.”90 
 
iii. American Agribusiness 
 
Agribusiness experts are concerned by what this merger could mean to farmers.91 Because 
of their large controlling share of the market, the combined company could ultimately raise prices 
and limit available options of pesticides and seeds.92 Higher prices are likely to influence the 
bipartisan political backlash noted above. What results is a chain reaction: The higher prices are 
for seeds and pesticides, the more the general public will pay for food.93 Products in the soy 
industry have the potential to have significantly higher prices. 94Additionally, some fear that with 
less competition comes less innovation, and the new mega company will focus more on 
profitability than pursuing “the sorts of innovations needed to improve crop yields and help feed a 
rapidly growing world.”95 
Most notable among those who oppose the merger is the National Farmers Union, which 
“represents family farmers, fishers and ranchers across the country, with formally organized 
                                                          
86 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, An Antitrust Review of a Bayer-Monsanto Merger, THE 
KONKURRENZ GRP. (July 22, 2016), http://www.konkurrenzgroup.com/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=111. 
87 Kennedy, supra note 84. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Associated Press, supra note 9. 
92 Id. 
93 Brad Plumer, Why Bayer’s Massive Deal to Buy Monsanto Is So Worrisome, VOX (Sept. 15, 2016, 3:04 
PM), http://www.vox.com/2016/9/14/12916344/monsanto-bayer-merger 
94 Emma Court, How a Bayer-Monsanto Merger Will Wind Up Costing You at the Grocery Store, 
MARKETWATCH (Sept.15, 2016, 6:59 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bayer-monsanto-tie-up-not-good-
news-for-anyone-who-eats-or-grows-food-2016-05-24.  
95 Plumer, supra note 93. 
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divisions in 33 states.”96 The organization represents 200,000 people.97 In a September 2016 
statement, National Farmers Union President Roger Johnson had this to say about the pending 
deal:  
 
For the last several days our family farm and ranch members have been on Capitol 
Hill asking Members of Congress to conduct hearings to review the staggering 
amount of pending merger deals in agriculture today. We will continue to express 
concern that these megadeals are being made to benefit the corporate boardrooms 
at the expense of family farmers, ranchers, consumers and rural economies.98  
 
Johnson goes on to call these megadeals an “alarming trend” in agribusiness that lead to “less 
competition, stifled innovation, higher prices and job loss in rural America.”99 This attitude reflects 
the longstanding concerns of those within the agribusiness industry in regards to federal antitrust 
laws.100 
                                                          
96 About NFU, NAT’L FARMERS UNION, https://nfu.org/about/ (last accessed Jan. 29, 2017).  
97 Join NFU Today!, NAT’L FARMERS UNION, https://nfu.org/join/ (last accessed March 1, 2017).  
98 NFU Condemns Bayer/Monsanto Deal, Asks for Critical Review of Consolidation in Ag, NAT’L 
FARMERS UNION (Sept. 14, 2016), https://nfu.org/2016/09/14/nfu-condemns-bayermonsanto-deal-asks-for-critical-
review-of-consolidation-in-ag/. 
99 Id. 
100 See generally John Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Direction for Agricultural Law, 75 
N.D. L. REV. 449, 450 (1999). This article outlines the benefits of agrarian antitrust laws:  
Part I of this article explains the inability of the antitrust laws to address the economic concentration 
issue that has historically concerned farmers and reviews strategies to reverse this failure by 
examining recent case law. Part II strengthens the case for an agrarian antitrust by appealing to the 
wider statutory regime built to protect the economic interests of farmers. Part III outlines a general 
theory of agrarian antitrust that avoids many of the problems reviewed in Part I and addresses the 
legislative priorities reviewed in Part II. Part III, after reviewing the absence of agrarian 
considerations in merger cases, also applies the theory to merger analysis, where it is of particular 
importance. Id. 
See also Doug O’Brien, Policy Approaches to Address Problems Associated with Consolidation and Vertical 
Integration in Agriculture, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 33, 34-35 (2004). This article focuses on the lack of choice caused 
by major agribusiness mergers:  
The essential problem with consolidation and vertical integration, when taken too far, is that such 
trends reduce choice in the marketplace. Problems arise when one player has choices and the other 
player does not. This lack of choice can lead to unequal bargaining power in business relationships. 
With unequal bargaining power, the more dominant firm will almost always take advantage of the 
more vulnerable party by squeezing price, shifting liabilities, or demanding certain things without 
paying an associated price. Consolidation and vertical integration provide this type of setting. The 
question for policy makers is how to deal with the possibility of abusive practices stemming from 
consolidation and vertical integration. This outline presents different ways to affect the power 
imbalance in the food and agriculture sector. The first set of techniques go to the heart of the 
problem, attempting to equalize the bargaining power of the players by (1) affecting the structure of 
the industry and reducing the power of the stronger party, or by (2) encouraging collective 
bargaining and increasing the power of the weaker party. The second set of techniques is closely 
related to the first set, yet seem to accept the existence of a power imbalance. These techniques 
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Tom Giesel, honorary historian for the National Farmers Union, had this to say about the 
pending deal: “‘It’ll have a large impact. I have no choice when I purchase inputs, be it seeds, 
chemicals, whatever. There is no choice. They own me.’”101 Regarding farming in general, he 
added: “‘Now, a lot of how we farm is being determined by someone far away in a boardroom that 
has little or no connection to the land and what’s happening out there.’”102 
Alicia Harvie, the advocacy and issues director of Farm Aid (a nonprofit organization 
founded in 1985 by Willie Nelson, Neil Young, and John Mellencamp, whose efforts and annual 
benefit concerts have raised more than $50 million to assist family farms103), has also expressed 
concern regarding the recent trend of consolidations.104 She noted:  
 
Across food and agriculture, the amount of pending mergers and mergers that got 
green-lighted last year and this year is phenomenal, it’s in the hundreds…. Whatever 
sector you’re looking at, be it livestock or crops, there’s consolidation going on, and 
that’s had some pretty dramatic consequences for input costs and costs of production 
for the availability of who they can market their goods to.105  
 
Contrarily, Bayer and Monsanto say that the deal will benefit farmers, as the companies 
will focus on innovative technology.106 Bayer CEO Werner Baumann downplayed the potential 
antitrust risks in an interview with CNBC’s “Squawk on the Street.”107 Said Baumann:  
 
So this actually speaks to the great quality of the combination we have in front of 
us. And we have very, very little overlap, that is of course going to enable a very, 
very, let’s say constructive discussion with regulators about their concerns on 
where we do have these overlaps. But it’s substantially less than in some of the 
other cases where there are significant product overlaps. This whole transaction and 
the whole vision we see is driven by growth and innovation and not necessarily 
                                                          
simply try to minimize the negative consequences of increased consolidation by (3) regulating the 
behavior of participants and (4) improving the enforcement of competition or trade practice laws. 
Id. 
101 Dan Nosowitz, How Will the Monsanto-Bayer Merger Affect Everyday Farmers?, MODERN FARMER 
(Oct. 20, 2016), http://modernfarmer.com/2016/10/monsanto-bayer-merger-2/ [emphasis added]. 
102 Id. 
103 About, FARM AID, https://www.farmaid.org/about-us/ (last accessed March 1, 2017).  
104 Nosowitz, supra note 101. 
105 Id. 
106 Henry Fernandez, Bayer and Monsanto CEOs: Farmers Need This Deal, FOX BUS. (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2016/09/14/bayer-and-monsanto-ceos-farmers-need-this-deal.html.  
107 First on CNBC: CNBC Transcript: Bayer CEO Werner Baumann and Monsanto CEO Hugh Grant 
Speak with CNBC’s David Faber on “Squawk on the Street” Today, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2:29 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/ 2016/09/14/first-on-cnbc-cnbc-transcript-bayer-ceo-werner-baumann-and-monsanto-ceo-
hugh-grant-speak-with-cnbcs-david-faber-on-squawk-on-the-street-today.html. 
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huge cost cutting. This combination is going to be driven by highly complimentary 
product portfolios.108 
 
Monsanto’s CEO, Hugh Grant, has a goal of “bringing seeds and chemistry alongside data 
science to shape the industry’s future.”109 In a recent interview, Grant stated, “I think at the end of 
the day it’s about opportunity. It is a great deal for our shareholders…but to [Bayer CEO] Werner’s 
point, more importantly, this a great deal for farmers because farmers are starving for 
innovations.”110 According to Grant, Monsanto is  
 
pleased we received such strong support from our shareowners. This is an important 
milestone as we work to combine our two complementary companies and deliver 
on our shared vision for the future of agriculture. By bringing together our expertise 
and our resources to drive this shared vision, we can do even more together to 
benefit growers around the world and to help address broad global challenges like 
climate change and food scarcity.111  
 
Supportive shareholders appear to have retained some skepticism, like the farmers; recent 
stock prices for Monsanto have been traded well below Bayer’s offer of $128.00 per share.112 
Although the deal was approved by Monsanto shareholders, there are reports that at least some are 
disappointed with the offered price per share.113 The lower-than-expected offers are potentially 
due to the current downturn in the farming industry as a whole.114 Recently, crop prices have gone 
down.115 Of course, the deal is not yet official. Currently, the merger has approximately a 50% 
chance of success,116 although this number could potentially increase under the Trump 
Administration, as Republicans have generally been more lenient towards major acquisitions in 
the United States.117 
                                                          
108 Id. 
109 Fernandez, supra note 106. 
110 Id. 
111 Monsanto Shareowners Approve Merger with Bayer, MONSANTO (Dec. 13, 2016), 
http://news.monsanto.com/press-release/corporate/monsanto-shareowners-approve-merger-bayer. 
112 Schwartz, supra note 31.  
113 Alessi & Bunge, supra note 10. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Fernandez, supra note 106. 
117 President Donald J. Trump was inaugurated on January 20, 2017, signaling a political shift in American 
politics. In an effort to appeal to the new Republican leader, Bayer has offered an increase in American jobs:  
President-elect Donald Trump met with the chief executives of German chemical giant Bayer and 
agriculture company Monsanto last week and discussed commitments to the U.S. following their 
planned $66 billion merger. The Trump team says as a result of the meeting, the companies made 
new pledges for jobs and research spending in the U.S. In a call with reporters Tuesday, transition 
171  VOL. 7 (2018) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
team spokesman Sean Spicer said Bayer and Monsanto committed to $8 billion in new R&D 
spending in the U.S., as well as to retain 100 percent of Monsanto’s U.S. workforce, create 3,000 
new U.S. high-tech jobs and to keep Monsanto’s headquarters in St. Louis. None of this, Spicer said, 
had been in the works previously.  
Meg Tirrell, Bayer, Monsanto Tout Jobs, Investment Pledge to Trump, But Analysts Question How Much is New, 
CNBC (Jan. 17, 2017, 3:16 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/17/bayers-pledge-to-trump-has-some-analysts-
scratching-their-heads.html.  
Also signaling the shift:  
Separately, the companies promised to spend $16 billion for research and development in agriculture 
over the next six years with half of those funds dedicated to the U.S. “This is an investment in 
innovation and people that will create several thousand new high-tech, well-paying jobs after 
integration is complete, jobs that will keep America at the forefront of agricultural innovation and 
that serve U.S. farmers by delivering better products and services faster” according to a joint 
statement released by Bayer’s CEO Werner Baumann and Monsanto chief Hugh Grant. 
Charlie Gasparino & Brian Schwartz, Monsanto Shares Up on Bayer-Trump Promise for Billions in U.S. Investment, 
Jobs, FOX BUS. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/01/17/monsanto-shares-up-on-bayer-
trump-promise-for-billions-in-u-s-investment-jobs.html. 
 Although President Trump is eager to approve the merger for potential job gains, it should be noted that 
there are potential job losses as well: 
Bayer said that geneticists, roboticists, satellite imagery specialists, engineers, data scientists, 
advanced breeders and statisticians were the types of jobs the combined company would be looking 
to add. But the Bayer spokesman did not address Spicer’s claim that no jobs would be lost. 
Executives for the two companies had hinted after the merger was announced that it could lead to 
job cuts on the administrative side of the business to reduce overlap—a common post-merger 
occurrence. According to a St. Louis Post-Dispatch report after the deal was announced, Liam 
Condon, head of Bayer’s crop science division, told journalists it was a good assumption R&D jobs 
were safe, but that it was ‘too early” to say what might happen to administrative jobs. 
Paul R. La Monica, Trump Takes Credit for Saving Monsanto Jobs, But…, CNN MONEY (Jan. 17, 2017, 3:54 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/17/investing/monsanto-bayer-trump-jobs/.  
The National Farmers Union has expressed concerns that the new Administration views the merger in a 
positive light:  
In a statement Tuesday, it said the meeting between the CEOs and president-elect “is deeply 
disturbing if it leads to an approval of the Bayer-Monsanto acquisition by the incoming Trump 
Administration.” Still, the meeting is “positive” for getting U.S. approval, though the merger still 
needs regulatory approval in other countries, Chris Shaw, an analyst at Monness Crespi Hardt & 
Co. in New York, said by phone. Bayer and Monsanto’s plan to stay and invest in the U.S. Midwest 
is key to its business, since it would market to farmers, but also lines up with Trump’s rhetoric, said 
Jason Miner, an analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence in Skillman, New Jersey.  
Justin Sink & Mario Park, Bayer-Monsanto Pledge Investment, Jobs after Trump Meeting, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 
2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-17/bayer-to-invest-8-billion-and-add-3-000-
jobs-trump-aide-says. 
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C. European Union Antitrust Laws 
i. The European Union 
 
The European Union, as it stands today, is much younger than the United States.118 
Officially established in 1993, the European Union is comprised of 28 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.119 The purpose of the European Union is to operate “a single market which allows free 
movement of goods, capital, services and people between member states.”120 
 
ii. The Applicable Laws 
 
With this purpose in mind, it is understandable that competition law is important for the 
European Union.121 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union details antitrust laws in 
the European Union.122 There are two important rules detailed in the Treaty: First, the Treaty 
“prohibits agreements between two or more independent market operators which restrict 
competition. This provision covers both horizontal agreements (between actual or potential 
competitors operating at the same level of the supply chain) and vertical agreements (between 
firms operating at different levels, i.e. agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor).”123 
Second, the Treaty “prohibits firms that hold a dominant position on a given market to abuse that 
position, for example by charging unfair prices, by limiting production, or by refusing to innovate 
to the prejudice of consumers.”124  
It has been suggested that if one wants to block a large, international merger, he or she 
should contact the European Union rather than the United States, as “EU antitrust regulators in 
recent years have been far more receptive to concerns about large mergers or anti-competitive 
conduct.”125 For example, a merger proposed in 2001 that would unite General Electric and 
Honeywell International, Inc. was approved in the United States and denied in the European 
                                                          
118 Michael Wilkinson, What is the EU, Why was it Created and When was it Formed?, TELEGRAPH (June 
22, 2016, 3:56 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/20/what-is-the-eu-why-was-it-created-and-when-
was-it-formed1/. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 EUR. COMM’N, supra note 12. “Competition encourages companies to offer consumers goods and 
services at the most favourable terms. It encourages efficiency and innovation and reduces prices. To be effective, 
competition requires companies to act independently of each other, but subject to the competitive pressure exerted 
by the others.” Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Larry Bumgardner, Antitrust Law in the European Union, GRAZIADO BUS. REV., 2005, available at 
https://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/antitrust-law-in-the-european-union/#_edn21. 
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Union.126 General Electric’s CEO Jack Welch commented, “‘The European regulators’ demands 
exceeded anything I or our European advisers imagined and differed sharply from antitrust 
counterparts in the U.S. and Canada.’”127 The key difference between the United States and 
European Union is enforcement of the laws. While U.S. laws “are in some respects more powerful” 
than their EU counterparts, “enforcement has been far more vigorous in the EU.”128 
In addition to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European 
Community Treaty contains provisions similar to those of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.129 
First, “Article 81 of the European Community Treaty prohibit[s] cartels and other ‘concerted 
practices’ that distort competition…. In general, ‘concerted action’ for a Section 1 violation means 
that at least two companies must be involved in restraining trade, as opposed to unilateral action 
by one business.”130 Second, “[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market…shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar 
as it may affect trade between Member States.”131  
Updated regulations in 2004 created similarities to the Sherman Antitrust Act, as well as 
the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.132 Historically, the European Union blocked mergers that 
created an “abuse of dominant position.”133 The new regulations allow “the EU to block mergers 
that ‘significantly impede effective competition.’”134 As a result, the new regulations have 
increased the number of mergers the European Union can block.135 Unlike the United States, prior 
court involvement is not required for regulatory agencies to block a proposed merger.136 
The European Commission is the regulatory agency responsible for enforcing antitrust laws 
in the European Union, like the FTC.137 Mergers that require approval by the European 
Commission must follow rules detailed in the EC Merger Regulation and the Implementing 
                                                          
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130  Id.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 EUR. COMM’N, MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/ 
procedures_en.html, (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
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Regulation.138 Additionally, U.S. and EU regulations share some similarities, such as their analysis 
of potential efficiencies and harms resulting from mergers.139  
Within the European Commission exists the Directorate General for Competition.140 This 
suborganization is responsible for enforcing the parts of the treaty highlighted above.141 When the 
European Commission is notified of a pending merger, it is investigated to determine whether the 
merger would “significantly impede effective competition in the EU.”142 The merger may then be 
approved unconditionally if no significant impediments are found to exist.143 However, if one or 
more significant impediments are found to exist, the merger must be prohibited if “no 
commitments aimed at removing the impediment are proposed by the merging firms by creating 
or strengthening a dominant player.”144 Conditionally approved mergers may be forced to alter 
their original agreements in various ways, such as “sell[ing] part of the combined business or to 
license technology to another market player.”145 
 
iii. Problems and Antitrust Violations 
 
As there are similarities in the laws of the United States and the European Union, it could 
be argued that the merger is potentially illegal under the antitrust laws set forth in the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union. The companies do not merely have a large presence in the 
United States; they are global companies that will be subjected to multiple laws, as they could 
potentially dominate markets in the European Union.146  
                                                          
138 EUR. COMM’N, MERGERS LEGISLATION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/ 
legislation.html (last visited March 1, 2017). 
139 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 350 (2011). 
140 EUR. COMM’N, PROCEEDINGS FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU: KEY ACTORS 
AND CHECKS AND BALANCES, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/key_actors_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 
2017). 
141 Id. 
142 EUR. COMM’N, MERGERS: OVERVIEW, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/overview_en.html (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2017).  
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See Lindsey Mattila, Antitrust Laws and the Bayer-Monsanto Merger, CLAREMONT J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 
Sept. 21, 2016, https://5clpp.com/2016/09/21/antitrust-laws-and-the-bayer-monsanto-merger/. Mattila discusses the 
nature of the deal and general skepticism:  
Many antitrust regulators, however, are not quite sold that these benefits outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects. Agricultural innovation is important to feed the growing global population, 
making competition in the industry more necessary than ever. These deals reduce competition in an 
industry that affects everyone worldwide. Were the Bayer-Monsanto deal to be approved, the new 
company would have control over a quarter of the world’s seed and pesticide stock. Decreased 
competition could lead to the new company raising prices for seeds and pesticides that are necessary 
for modern farming, thus raising costs for consumers. American, German, and other governments 
with authority in this deal want to ensure that there is still fair competition in the market if the two 
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The companies also have long-standing, sometimes sordid histories and reputations that 
may be a general sense of concern.147  
A merger of this magnitude falls within the threshold guidelines of the EU Merger 
Regulation.148 The European Commission must examine mergers that meet the following 
thresholds:  
The first alternative requires: (i) a combined worldwide turnover of all the merging 
firms over €5 000 million, and (ii) an EU-wide turnover for each of at least two of the 
firms over €250 million. The second alternative requires: (i) a worldwide turnover of 
all the merging firms over €2 500 million, and (ii) a combined turnover of all the 
merging firms over € 100 million in each of at least three Member States, (iii) a turnover 
of over €25 million for each of at least two of the firms in each of the three Member 
                                                          
companies were to merge. Bayer will have to get approval for antitrust laws in over 30 jurisdictions 
around the world. Id.  
See generally Bayer and Monsanto to Create a Global Leader in Agriculture, BAYER (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://www.press.bayer.com/baynews/baynews.nsf/id/ADSF8F-Bayer-and-Monsanto-to-Create-a-Global-Leader-in-
Agriculture. This is a press release issued by Bayer in response to the pending merger, and contains the following 
description of each company:  
Bayer is a global enterprise with core competencies in the Life Science fields of health care and 
agriculture. Its products and services are designed to benefit people and improve their quality of life. 
At the same time, the Group aims to create value through innovation, growth and high earning 
power. Bayer is committed to the principles of sustainable development and to its social and ethical 
responsibilities as a corporate citizen. In fiscal 2015, the Group employed around 117,000 people 
and had sales of EUR 46.3 billion. Capital expenditures amounted to EUR 2.6 billion, R&D 
expenses to EUR 4.3 billion. These figures include those for the high-tech polymers business, which 
was floated on the stock market as an independent company named Covestro on October 6, 2015…. 
Monsanto is committed to bringing a broad range of solutions to help nourish our growing world. 
We produce seeds for fruits, vegetables and key crops—such as corn, soybeans, and cotton—that 
help farmers have better harvests while using water and other important resources more efficiently. 
We work to find sustainable solutions for soil health, help farmers use data to improve farming 
practices and conserve natural resources, and provide crop protection products to minimize damage 
from pests and disease. Through programs and partnerships, we collaborate with farmers, 
researchers, nonprofit organizations, universities and others to help tackle some of the world’s 
biggest challenges. Id. 
147 Lydia Mulvany, Heroin, Nazis, and Agent Orange: Inside the $66 Billion Merger of the Year – These 
Companies Used to Sell Heroin and Agent Orange. Now, They Want to Form the World’s Largest Supplier of Seeds 
and Pesticides, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14 2016, 1:09 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-14/the-
heroin-laced-history-behind-the-year-s-biggest-deal. Although Bayer attempts to maintain a clean reputation, 
especially considering protests against Monsanto, “Two friends making dyes from coal-tar started Bayer in 1863, 
and it developed into a chemical and drug company famous for introducing heroin as a cough remedy in 1896, then 
aspirin in 1899. The company was a Nazi contractor during World War II and used forced labor. The company was 
a Nazi contractor during World War II and used forced labor.” Id. Monsanto, already hated for its contribution to the 
GMO industry, also has a dark past: “It’s famous for making some controversial and highly toxic chemicals like 
polychlorinated biphenyls, now banned and commonly known as PCBs, and the herbicide Agent Orange, which was 
used by the U.S. military in Vietnam.” Id. 
148 EUR. COMM’N, MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES, supra note 137. 
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States included under ii, and  (iv) EU-wide turnover of each of at least two firms of 
more than €100 million.”149  
 
At $66 billion, the proposed merger must be examined by the European Commission.150 
 
iv. European Union Agribusiness 
 
Agribusiness experts in the European Union have raised similar concerns to those in the 
United States.151 Margrethe Vestager, the European Union’s antitrust chief, recently stated that 
“that farmers must continue to have a choice when buying seeds and pesticides after the merger 
between Bayer and Monsanto.”152 With an already concentrated market, choice may prove 
difficult.153 As in the United States, consumer selection may be significantly diminished, and 
prices may potentially rise.154 As noted previously, the companies believe the merger will benefit 
farmers due to innovative technology.155 One key difference is that unlike the United States, where 
Monsanto has a large presence in the genetically modified crop industry, the European Union has 
strict regulations and prohibitions against the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).156 
While not unique to the European Union, concerns about GMOs are much more prevalent 
in the EU than in the United States.157 In the United States, GMOs are commonplace; in the 
European Union, Monsanto is viewed as a villain.158 “Monsanto has become the main target of the 
anti-GMO movement globally—particularly in Europe, where it faces ongoing controversy over 
its most widely-used weed killer glyphosate, which environmentalists continue to seek to ban.”159 
                                                          
149 Id. 
150 See generally Foreign Exchange Rates, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_eu.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). As of January 27, 2017, 
the exchange rates between Euros and United States Dollars is 1.0690. Id. 
151 Farmers Must Have Choice Post Bayer-Monsanto Merger—EU’s Vestager, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2016, 
10:07 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/monsanto-ma-bayer-eu-idUSP6N196041. 
152 Id. 
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154 Plumer, supra note 93. 
155 FTC, GUIDE TO ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 2. 
156 Tyler Cowen, People Aren't Thinking Straight about Bayer and Monsanto, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2016, 
10:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-19/people-aren-t-thinking-straight-about-bayer-and-
monsanto. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Edel-Quinn Agbaegbu, The Impact of Bayer-Monsanto Merger on GMOs in Europe and Africa, EWHC 
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2016), http://everywomanhopecentre.org/news/blog/2016/10/06/the-impact-of-bayer-monsanto-
merger-on-gmos-in-europe-and-africa/. 
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The company has sparked global protests, some of them occurring annually.160 The anti-Monsanto 
sentiment is so strong that, should the merger be approved by regulators, many doubt that Bayer 
will continue to use the Monsanto name.161 
 
Part of Bayer’s strategy in acquiring Monsanto is to create a global behemoth in the 
production of crops through so called genetically modified organisms—a 
technology that can mass produce food at a relatively low cost. But the so-called 
GMO business is controversial and Monsanto—the biggest GMO producer—has 
faced a wave of protests from consumer advocates who believe these types of crops 
lead to severe health problems for those who consume them.162  
 
Of course, political sentiments can change. A recent seminar at the European Union 
Parliament discussed the impact of GMOs “with the objective to unshackle innovation in 
agricultural biotechnology so that it reaches the farmers to feed the growing global 
population.”163 Many industry experts have spoken about the importance of GMOs in a world 
filled with hungry and malnourished people.164 The seminar, Unshackling Innovation: Will 
Europe Block or Enable GM Crops?, was organized by Public Research and Regulation 
Initiative (PRRI) and EuropaBio, both members of the biotechnology industry.165 
As these political concerns will undoubtedly weigh heavily on regulators’ minds in the 
coming months, the recently proposed DuPont-Dow merger may shed some light on how European 
authorities will treat the proposed business deal.166 Like the Bayer-Monsanto merger, the DuPont-
Dow merger is also pending; however, it is expected to close in June 2017.167 Should DuPont-Dow 
deal fail to gain approval of European antitrust authorities, it is likely the proposed Bayer-
Monsanto merger will follow suit.168  
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Currently, the DuPont-Dow deal has resulted in “serious European regulator pushback,” 
and the companies have been delayed three months in their attempts to gain approval.169 Some 
sources in Washington, DC, do not believe the merger will be successful in the European Union.170 
Recently, European Union antitrust chief “Margrethe Vestager said that both companies face a 
‘still very open’ outcome.”171 Concerns focus on the industry as a whole becoming more 
consolidated.172 
 
D. Illegality and Detriment 
 
Currently, the Bayer-Monsanto merger has raised concerns in the United States and the 
European Union,173 where it is being reviewed before the acquisition can officially become 
binding. Based on current precedent, the merger is illegal in both the U.S. and EU. To protect 
agribusiness in both locations, the merger should be blocked. 
The Bayer Monsanto merger is a direct violation of the Clayton Act. The Clayton Act 
prohibits any merger that substantially lessens competition.174 Per the United States Supreme 
Court,  
 
a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the 
relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms 
in that market is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must 
be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely 
to have such anticompetitive effects.175  
 
The Bayer Monsanto merger clearly fits this mold. Allowing the two companies to combine would 
mean that one company controlled 28% of the global pesticide market and significant amount of 
the corn and soybean industries.176 When one company controls more than a quarter of any given 
market, there is a clear argument that competition is lacking in this market. 
The merger is also illegal under the European Union antitrust laws. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union “prohibits agreements between two or more independent 
market operators which restrict competition.”177 Additionally, the European Committee must not 
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allow mergers that exceed the threshold limits178 if they “significantly impede effective 
competition.”179 Bayer and Monsanto are currently two independent market operators. If they are 
permitted to merge, this merger would restrict competition in agribusiness, predominantly in the 
global pesticide and seed markets.180 Therefore, the merger should be prohibited by the European 
Committee. 
The deal benefits the corporations, but creates problems for farmers and consumers 
worldwide.181 Farmers will become even more limited with regard to the equipment they need to 
run their farms effectively (i.e., seeds and pesticides).182 They will be forced to buy Bayer-
Monsanto seeds, and protect them with Bayer-Monsanto pesticides.183 Should the Bayer-Monsanto 
combination decide to raise its prices, those increases will further strain an already downturned 
agricultural industry.184  
There is also likely to be less innovation in the farming industry.185 Despite Bayer’s claim 
that the purpose of the merger is innovation,186 the reality is when there is less competition, there 
is less of a need to continuously improve one’s product in order to convince the public to buy your 
product. These corporations exist to make a profit. Regardless of their noble intents, they owe a 
fiduciary duty to their shareholders to make the company as profitable as possible. 
The merger is also a dangerous political move in both the United States and the European 
Union, for different reasons. In the United States, people have already reached out to their public 
officials with concerns about the merger.187 These officials, particularly members of Congress, 
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I’m writing to thank you for your past leadership regarding increased business concentration in our 
nation and the proper role of antitrust laws in safeguarding competition and innovation. As one of 
your constituents, I want to express to you how deeply alarmed I am by the recent proposed merger 
of A.G. Bayer and Monsanto. Even more alarming, this merger is occurring in the midst of several 
other mergers in the agricultural sector. As I’m sure you know, our farmers are increasingly 
squeezed from both sides in their business. They pay high prices for seeds and other inputs, and the 
price they can sell for is kept down by concentration in the distribution market. We need our farmers 
as stewards of the land and as producers of our food. This merger is bad for them. That is why I’m 
particularly concerned about the Bayer-Monsanto merger from an innovation and environmental 
perspective. We already have too little research and innovation in this field. And the companies that 
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need the support of the public so that they may be reelected. For example, SumOfUs has organized 
a letter to Senator Mike Lee to encourage him to oppose the deal: “Utah Senator Mike Lee is 
among the few to voice concern over this merger. Sen. Lee is up for re-election in November—
which means he will be especially receptive to our call to do the right thing.”188 
In the European Union, public opinion about GMOs is so negative that supporting a merger 
between Bayer and Monsanto would not be a good choice politically.189 Bayer itself appears to be 
depending on its own strong reputation to counterbalance Monsanto’s overly poor one.190 
Although the European Union generally has stronger opposition than the United States to mergers 
such as this,191 any support for a merger that would give Monsanto additional power in Europe is 
likely to be faced with strong political opposition. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Both the United States and the European Union have well-established antitrust laws. In the 
United States, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
work side-by-side to enforce four main pieces of legislation: the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 
the Clayton Act of 1914, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act of 1976.192 In the European Union, the European Commission acts to enforce 
the antitrust provisions established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.193 In 
the United States, the goal is to prevent mergers and acquisitions that will “substantially lessen 
competition.”194 In the European Union, the goal is to prevent mergers and acquisitions that will 
“significantly impede effective competition.”195 
Either way it is phrased, the pending Bayer Monsanto deal is a direct violation of antitrust 
laws in the United States and the European Union. It faces strong opposition from both farmers196 
and anti-GMO activists.197 The merger would put approximately 28% of the global pesticide 
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market into the company’s hands, as well as create an overly large presence in the seed industry.198 
Farmers would have extremely limited choices,199 and could potentially be subjected to higher 
prices and a lack of innovation.200 
For the reasons outlined above, the Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division, and the European Committee should all block the pending merger between 
agribusiness giants Bayer and Monsanto. 
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